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BITCOIN AND THE RISE OF DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS
ORGANIZATIONS

“[I]t makes most sense to see Bitcoin […] as a decentralized autonomous organization.”
Vitalik Buterin, Industry Expert, Co-founder of Ethereum and Co-founder of Bitcoin Magazine

ABSTRACT
Bitcoin represents the first real-world implementation of a “decentralized autonomous
organization” (DAO) and offers a new paradigm for organization design. Imagine working for a
global business organization whose routine tasks are powered by a software protocol instead of
being governed by managers and employees. Task assignments and rewards are randomized by the
algorithm. Information is not channelled through a hierarchy but recorded transparently and
securely on an immutable public ledger called “blockchain”. Further, the organization decides on
design and strategy changes through a democratic voting process involving a previously unseen class
of stakeholders called “miners”. Agreements need to be reached at the organizational level for any
proposed protocol changes to be approved and activated.
How do DAOs solve the universal problem of organizing with such novel solutions? What
are the implications? We use Bitcoin as an example to shed light on how a DAO works in the
cryptocurrency industry, where it provides a peer-to-peer, decentralized and disintermediated
payment system that can compete against traditional financial institutions. We also invite
commentaries from renowned organization scholars to share their views on this intriguing
phenomenon.
Keywords: Decentralized autonomous organization; blockchain; consensus mechanisms; new forms
of organizing; organizational forms
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WHAT IS BITCOIN?
Bitcoin is an open source software code that implements a decentralized, peer-to-peer digital
cash payment system that does not require any trusted intermediaries to operate (e.g., banks or
payment companies). The Bitcoin Whitepaper was published in 2008 by a developer (or
development team) under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto, and was soon followed by the first
ever “coin” created in the form of a digital record in 2009. At the time of writing (October 2017),
Bitcoin hit another record high price of over $4,400, forming an economy of $73 billion.
Initially, Bitcoin’s design aimed to solve the inherent inefficiencies and agency problems
arising from the intermediated and centralized banking model. Typically, to make an international
wire transfer between, say, Canada and China, the money goes through four different banks
(including two “correspondent” banks), two national payments systems, and an international
settlement service (e.g., SWIFT). A standard international payment takes between 3 and 15 business
days to complete, depending on the destination country, and involves multiple agents such as bank
tellers, employees, and managers from the aforementioned financial institutions. Expensive bank
fees and exchange rates apply.
By contrast, Bitcoin is distributed in cyberspace across thousands of network nodes, and is
inherently borderless. Payments are validated and updated by the network every 10 minutes.
Intermediaries are not required (e.g. no correspondent banks are required). There are no bank fees
for transactions, but users typically pay a small fee to payment validators (known as “miners”- to be
discussed further below). Whereas for an international transfer of $5,000, a bank wiring would
charge a fee of around $125, a fee of around $1 would be expected for a Bitcoin transfer. It is no
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wonder, that Bitcoin is seen as a potentially significant disruptor of the current financial system
based on banking.3
BITCOIN AS A “DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION” (DAO)
Bitcoin “runs a payment system…employs subcontractors who are miners… paid for with
newly issued bitcoin shares in itself” (Vigna & Casey, 2015:229, quoting Larimer, 2013)4. The Bitcoin
system thus shares the four core features common to all conceptualizations of “organizations”: it is a
“multi-agent system […] with identifiable boundaries and [a] purpose […] towards which the
constituent agents’ efforts make a contribution” (Puranam 2017: 6). But in contrast to traditional
organizations, Bitcoin does not have a CEO or top management team but instead developers who
“write the rulebook,” i.e., define governance rules for the program (Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten,
Miller & Goldfeder, 2016: 173-175); Bitcoin does not have headquarters, subsidiaries, or employees,
but a distributed network of users and miners who collect, verify, and update transactions on a
shared public ledger that is publicly auditable. Decisions on code modifications are made through
community-based democratic voting processes, backed by miners’ computing power for
implementation (Narayanan et al., 2016: 173-175).
Two significant innovations underpin Bitcoin: a technological one, namely the public and
distributed ledger technology called “blockchain”, which securely maintains an immutable record of
all user transactions; and an organizational innovation, namely, the existence of an open network of
users with special roles and rights called “miners”, who lend computing power to secure the network
in exchange for newly minted bitcoins and voting rights with respect to future protocol revisions
(Davidson, De Filippi & Potts, 2016a; 2016b).
3

Thus, the term ‘bitcoin’ sometimes refers to the tokens, to the network, to the protocol/software, or to
all three elements at once (i.e. the entire payment system).
4
Daniel Larimer, founder of Bitshare, first coined the term “decentralized autonomous corporation”
(DAC). The name DAC was later broadened as DAO by Vitalik Buterin, co-founder of Ethereum and
Bitcoin Magazine, to include varying forms of blockchain-based organizations.
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These innovations have led some industry experts to conceive of the Bitcoin system as the
first real-world implementation of a new type of organization called “decentralized autonomous
organization” (hereafter, DAO). Following prior work, we define DAOs as non-hierarchical
organizations that perform and record routine tasks on a peer-to-peer, cryptographically secure, public network, and
rely on the voluntary contributions of their internal stakeholders to operate, manage, and evolve the organization
through a democratic consultation process (Van Valkenburgh, Dietz, De Filippi, Shadab, Xethalis & Bollier,
2015; Dietz, Xethalis, De Filippi & Hazard, accessed 2016)5. DAOs coordinate routine tasks through
cryptographic routines (as opposed to human routines). Open source code defines rules for miners
to agree on a shared history of transactions recorded securely and redundantly across network nodes,
in order to avoid having a single point of failure (Nakamoto, 2008). While Bitcoin was the first
instance to be identified as a DAO, a few hundred more have then been created since 2009 (e.g.
Ethereum, Litecoin).
BITCOIN vs. BANKS
Bitcoin represents a partial substitute for banks, albeit with notable differences.
First, one cannot open a bank account without providing a number of official identification
documents, which in the developing world often prevents access to banking. By contrast, anyone
can become a Bitcoin user and freely obtain a pseudonymous Bitcoin address (i.e., analogous to a
bank account) not tied ex ante to a real-world identity. In essence, a Bitcoin address is a public key
cryptographically linked to a private key acting as a password to spend funds. This enables a new
privacy model that separates identity from transactions (Nakamoto, 2008). The vertical bar in Figure
1 demonstrates where Bitcoin breaks the information flow as compared to banks.
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While some industry experts prefer the term “distributed organization” over DAO, we opted for DAO to avoid confusion, since
“distributed organization” is already used in the management literature to describe work organized across geographically
dispersed locations (e.g., Hinds & Kiesler, 2002; Lee & Cole, 2003; Orlikowski, 2002).
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Second, at an aggregate level, traditional banks store transaction histories in a centralized
fashion. Users only get to view their personal bank statements and must trust that their information
is protected from both cyberattacks and employee misconduct. Traditionally, banks employ bank
clerks to process payments. Human agents are prone to agency problems which can lead to
misconduct such as theft. The cost of paying the human agents is also not trivial. With Bitcoin, all
transactions are recorded publicly and electronically onto the immutable “blockchain” stored in a
distributed fashion across thousands of network nodes – thereby making records easier to maintain
and cyberattacks unlikely to succeed (because the information on transactions in this case is not held
in one central location). The blockchain technology provides the multi-site copies of “ledgers”which are really aggregations of past transactions (e.g. like a bank account statement). It also
provides encryption to validate transactions as valid or invalid (E.g. like personal security device we
currently use for online banking, which generate a unique transaction specific signature based on a
personal key).
Whereas banks prevent double-spending by checking for funds sufficiency in a centralized
server, in a peer-to-peer system like Bitcoin, payees cannot verify whether payers still have the funds
they claim to have due to unpredictable network delays (e.g. an email sent now can reach its
recipient before another email sent a minute earlier). To resolve this issue, Bitcoin relies on
cryptographic routines to verify, timestamp, and order transactions in a non-reversible way, thereby
avoiding the need for human reconciliation. This process is called “mining”. The key idea is that
somebody in the network will legitimately time stamp a block of transactions, but we cannot predict
who that will be (e.g. replacing a bank clerk, who can be corrupted to fake time stamps, with a
system that cannot be corrupted).
Bitcoin “hires” miners to process transactions in this way through a “competitive
bookkeeping” process (Yermack, 2017). Mining is a process whereby specific network nodes
6

(“miners”) arrange new transactions into a sequence, and time-stamp them by solving a puzzle of
sorts: by guessing an arbitrarily long number after making billions of random guesses. The guessing
process can be made faster by committing more computing power to the network. Thus, a miner’s
probability of being able to provide the “proof-of-work” required to update the ledger is
proportional to the computing power s/he controls. The computing power committed every ten
minutes to blocks of transactions recorded in the ledger accumulates and forms a barrier to hacking,
making it practically impossible to edit past transaction records contained in the blockchain (i.e. the
proof-of-work would have to be entirely redone for every block added after the edited one, which is
too computationally intensive and too costly to achieve). Miners get rewarded in Bitcoin for their
work, which involves costs in hardware and electricity, as per the Bitcoin protocol.
CONSENSUS MECHANISMS: NOVEL SOLUTIONS TO THE UNIVERSAL
PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZING
Whereas mining organizes Bitcoin payment processing, “humans must first decide what
protocol to run before the machines can enforce it (Lopp, 2016)”. To distinguish the logic of
blockchain from its governance and re-design process, we define machine consensus as the process
whereby blockchain produces agreement (aided by miners efforts) on the ordering of transactions
through the time-stamping created by miners succeeding at guessing random number; and social
consensus as the process whereby miners vote on protocol update proposals introduced by volunteer
developers. Machine consensus and social consensus fuel Bitcoin’s novel organizational model and
become integrated through the unique mining process based on computing power provision.
Machine Consensus: the Bitcoin Payment System
Proof-of-work mining is a computationally intensive and highly redundant process that
generates inefficiencies in terms of energy consumption. But as a result, the blockchain record
cannot be tampered with at a profit. With machine consensus, tasks are allocated based on
7

commitments in computing power, and rewarded competitively based on the outcome of mining.
All mining-related data are publicly auditable for the entire network. Table 1 shows how Bitcoin as a
payment system organizes differently from banks and payment organizations.
Social Consensus: Protocol Upgrades
Underlying the Bitcoin payment system is the blockchain software supported by ongoing
protocol updates (Wang & Vergne, 2017). In terms of governance, miners’ voting on protocol
update proposals resembles the community-based management of Open Source Software
Development (OSSD) observed for projects such as Linux. It aligns stakeholder expectations (Lopp,
2016) and facilitates knowledge sharing, problem solving, and the realization of collective outcomes
(O’Mahony & Lakhani, 2009). Like OSSD, Bitcoin software development is also open source,
decentralized, and community-based. Bitcoin communities of volunteer software developers
collaborate in a non-hierarchical network and self-select into tasks and roles based on expertise and
preferences. Over time, a team of core Bitcoin developers has formed and become increasingly
influential in the community, even though their work is not funded by a centralized organization,
but by a sponsorship program that relies on donations.
The key organizational novelty of Bitcoin as compared to OSSD is that in addition to
developers, miners play an equally important role in protocol modifications. Specifically, the Bitcoin
software is updated through Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs), which are design documents
proposing new features, changes, or processes for the protocol. BIPs allow developers to make
proposals on software updates that miners must vote on to trigger implementation. Proposals are
first reviewed by BIP editors, and miners then include a “yes” or “no” vote in a block during the
polling period (e.g., 100 blocks starting today, namely a 1,000 minutes period). Voting power is
proportional to the computing power a miner contributes to the network. A code change will only
be implemented when a majority of 55% is obtained for a given proposal (Franco, 2014: 90). Table 2
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compares Bitcoin software development with OSSD along four core dimensions of organizing: task
division, task allocation, reward distribution, and information flow (Puranam, Alexy & Reitzig, 2014).
Bitcoin’s true organizational novelty lies in how mining determines task division (based on
computing power contribution), task allocation and reward distribution (through competitive
bookkeeping), and information flows (on the blockchain and in the network). While task integration
in traditional settings focuses on rules and processes designed in large part by managers (Okhuysen
& Bechky, 2009), with Bitcoin, machine consensus (e.g. competitive bookkeeping) and social
consensus (e.g. voting) are coordinated through miners—a brand new class of stakeholders.
Miners consent to playing by the rulebook, but they can vote to change it using the influence
derived from their computing power. However, it is important to note that the Bitcoin code does
not assume away the problem of agency costs. Rather, Bitcoin explicitly deals with these longstanding problems by incorporating counterbalancing incentives in the code, making the payment
system incorruptible.
In contrast to OSSD contexts, Bitcoin relies on a mixed community of volunteer developers
and paid miners who jointly revise the organizational design through BIPs. Put simply, Bitcoin
offers a novel solution to “the universal problems of organizing” (Puranam et al., 2014) by involving
a new class of stakeholders, incentivized by both machine consensus algorithms and social
consensus routines, with the design of an organization whose parameters cannot be changed
unilaterally by any stakeholder group, and whose routine operations cannot be derailed by insiders’
covert misconduct.
SIMILAR BLOCKCHAIN IMPLEMENTATIONS: CRYPTOCURRENCIES
Bitcoin is the first and most established DAO implemented to date. Since Bitcoin, there
have been over 800 other DAOs created based on similar designs, most of which are considered to
be “cryptocurrencies” (i.e., like Bitcoin, they allow for value exchange). At the time of writing,
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cryptocurrencies form an economy of $110 billion and make a real impact on the world. Some
cryptocurrencies are developed based on the Bitcoin source code (e.g., Litecoin, Namecoin, Dash),
while others started from scratch with their own protocol (e.g., Monero, Ethereum). Variations have
also emerged to embrace a wider range of applications other than just payments, such as
decentralized domain registration (Namecoin), smart contracts (Ethereum), and privacy (Monero).
Proof-of-work mining is not anymore the only way to achieve machine consensus, as alternative or
complementary schemes such as proof-of-stake (whereby the security proof is based on the amount
of cryptocurrencies payment validators hold) or proof-of-burn (whereby the network is secured by
validators allocating coins to an unspendable address) have been developed and implemented in
recent years. Preliminary research suggests that DAO performance varies with the extent of
governance decentralization (Hsieh, Vergne & Wang, 2017), so understanding how various forms of
machine and social consensus contribute to the success and failure of DAOs represents an exciting
avenue for future organizational research.
COMPANIES OF THE FUTURE?
Research indicates that the technological innovation potential behind cryptocurrencies
stands as the key driver of their market value (Wang & Vergne, 2017). But, as the Economist (2015)
rightly points out, blockchain technology has far-reaching applications beyond cryptocurrencies and
payments. In fact, blockchain-based organizing and the resulting DAOs have the ability to replace
centralized intermediaries in other applications requiring complex coordination such as asset
ownership tracking, trade financing, digital identity provision, supply chain traceability, and more.
Besides, in the last three years, more than fifty new ventures

received seed funding using

blockchain-powered “initial coin offerings”, thereby bypassing, at least partly, the use of venture
capitalist intermediaries to obtain funding faster and at more favorable valuations (e.g. in 2014,
Ethereum raised $18.4 million in a few days and is now valued at $34 billion). DAOs are on the rise,
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and it is an exciting time for management and organizational scholars to address this emerging
phenomenon with new theory and solid empirical research.
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FIGURE AND TABLES
Figure 1 Traditional Privacy Model vs. the Bitcoin Privacy Model (adopted from Nakamoto, 2008)
Traditional Privacy Model

New Privacy Model

Table 1 Banks and Payment Organizations vs. Bitcoin on their Forms of Organizing
Goal

Provision of a Payment System
Banks and Payment Organizations
Bitcoin

Mechanism

Centralized hierarchies

Mining: Competitive bookkeeping

Task
Division

Centralized task division by job
descriptions/ definitions, divided by
formal organizational structure
Assigned by formal hierarchies

Task division is based on the criterion of computing
power dedicated for mining, and is automated by the
blockchain software in a decentralized fashion.
Miners self-select into the network. However,
competitive bookkeeping only allocates payment
validation tasks to the winning miner (essentially
chosen at random, though the probability of
winning is proportional to computing power
committed).
Automated, randomized, transparent. Linked with
task allocation through competitive bookkeeping.

Task
Allocation

Reward
Distribution
Information
Flow

Defined by formal compensation/
incentive programs. In general, reward
schemes are not publicly available.
Centrally controlled by organizational
rules. Inconsistencies can persist
across teams, divisions, or subsidiaries.
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Transaction history is recorded in the blockchain,
which is publicly auditable and immutable.
Information is distributed among network nodes
and machine consensus ensures all nodes have the
same record.

Table 2 Updating Software Protocol: Open-Source Software Development vs. Bitcoin
Goal
Mechanism
Task
Division

Protocol Update
OSSD
Community governance

Task
Allocation

Some centralization based on the
structure provided by the founder;
evolvable with community.
Open participation through selfselection into the community

Reward
Distribution

Intrinsic motivation,
professionalism, visibility,

Information
Flow

Information is processed through
“virtual support infrastructure and
tools” (Puranam et al., 2014)

Bitcoin (BIP)
Voting: Bitcoin improvement proposal (BIPs) (Social
consensus)
Founder is unknown; BIPs proposed by developers
and voted on by miners coordinate code
modification. Centralization is undesirable.
Developers contribute to code upgrades through
open participation and self-selection. Miners vote on
the protocol change based on to computing power.
Developers volunteer and are motivated by intrinsic
motivation. Miners are paid in Bitcoin and are driven
by mining profitability.
Information is shared and communicated through
BIPs communication on the code repository (i.e.,
GitHub) and reflected in miners’ voting outcomes on
the blockchain.
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